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courts of last resort have passed on it and in one of those courts comment on
the subject was merely dictum.
It is submitted that the Dempsey case states a sound rule.3 0 An uninformed
jury might inadvertently deviate from the court's charge and add to the award,
under the misconception that it will be reduced by taxes. If the jury is informed
of the exemption, and is specifically instructed neither to add to nor deduct from
the actual damages, neither party can complain, since it must be presumed that
a jury will not deliberately violate the instructions of the court. In the excep-
tional case in which the jury fails to follow its instructions, and returns a
verdict, the amount of which is against the weight of the evidence, the trial
court has not only the power, but also the duty of ordering a new trial.37
THE PAIN DOCTRINE AND PROBLEMS RAISED BY
THE FERMAC CASE
INTRODUCTION
A surety's basic function is to secure a debt or obligation running from the
principal debtor to the creditor. A consensual surety is, after payment, entitled
to reimbursement' and subrogation,2 while before payment, he is entitled to
exoneration. 3 In addition to this right of exoneration, many jurisdictions'
recognize the surety's right to demand or request that the creditor proceed
against the principal, and hold that a surety is discharged at least to the extent
that he is injured by noncompliance on the part of the creditor with such
demand or request. Although New York is among those states adhering to
this rule known as the doctrine of Pain v. Packard,5 the rule's exact limits in
this state are not clearly defined. The decision in National Sav. Bank v.
Fermac Corp.0 exemplifies several New York cases which apparently extended
the doctrine7 and reversed the prior restrictive attitude of the majority of
36. Accord, Note, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 543, 550 (1956).
37. Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186 F.2d 926 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 904 (1951).
1. Simpson, Suretyship § 43, at 224-37 (1950).
2. latthews v. Aikin, 1 N.Y. 595, 599 (184S). See In re McClancy's Estate, 132 Msc.
866, 869, 45 N.Y.S.2d 917, 921 (Surr. Ct. 1943).
3. Hayes v. Ward, 4 Johns Ch. 123, 130 (N.Y. 1819). See Roberts v. Keene, 74 Misc.
233, 240, 133 N.Y. Supp. 1091, 1093-94 (Sup. Ct. 1911).
4. Very few states outside New York allow it by case law. See Martin v. Skehan, 2 Colo.
614 (1375); Hellen v. Crawford, 44 Pa. 105 (1862). Eighteen states allow it by statute:
0Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, Iflinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Mi-ssippi, MIis-
souri, North Carolina, Ohio, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wyoming.
Comment, 37 Yale L.J. 971, 973 n.9 (1928).
S. Pain v. Packard, 13 Johns. 174 (N.Y. 1316). See Church v. Simmons-, 33 N.Y. 261,
264 (ISSO); Albany Dutch Church v. Vedder, 14 Wend. 165, 171 (N.Y. 135); The Court
Press, Inc. v. Aronstein, 139 Mlisc. 145, 249 N.Y. Supp. 70 (N.Y. Munic. CL 1931).
6. 241 App. Div. 204, 271 N.Y. Supp. 836 (3d Dep't), aff'd mem, 266 N.Y. 443, 194 N.E.
145 (1934).
7. See notes 32-34 infra.
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decisions in New York.8 The Fermac case grants an opportunity to reexamine
the development of this doctrine in New York, and to consider several correla-
tive problems respecting the discharge of a surety.
THE RULE OF PAIN V. PACKARD
In the ordinary case, a creditor's mere inactivity or leniency in pursuing the
principal, so as to enforce the obligation after maturity, does not justify a dis-
charge of the surety, since the latter, on or after the maturity date, may pay
and avail himself of his remedies of reimbursement or subrogation against the
principal.9 However, there are two instances where the dilatory creditor loses
the surety's protection. First, a surety who as a guarantor of collection, promises
to be liable only if the principal debtor becomes insolvent or for other reasons
can not pay, 10 is entitled to a discharge to the extent that he is injured as a
result of the neglect of the creditor to enforce his rights against the principal."
This is not a true exception to the general rule, however, inasmuch as its basis
is contractual and does not depend upon the nature of the surety relationship.
A second, and more basic departure from the ordinary case involving dilatory
creditors is the Pain v. Packard doctrine which imposes a duty of diligence upon
a creditor where he has been urged to sue his debtor by an apprehensive surety.
Under English law there is no protection similar to that granted in Pain v.
Packard. The fact that the surety has a right of exoneration whereby he may
force payment of the debt in equity is considered a sufficient safeguard.12 In
the United States, the Pain v. Packard doctrine owes its origin to a Virginia
statute enacted in 1794.13 It was not, however, until the Pain decision in 1816
that the doctrine found its way into the cases. There, a co-maker on a demand
note urged the holder to proceed immediately to collect the money from the
maker. The holder delayed taking action against the maker until the latter
had become insolvent and absconded. The court held that the request to sue,
under these circumstances, bound the holder to proceed with due diligence
against the maker, and that his failure to act discharged the surety.14 Although
8. See notes 20-24 infra.
9. Schroeppell v. Shaw, 3 N.Y. 446, 461-62 (1850). See Otto v. Lincoln Say. Bank, 49
N.Y.S.2d 407, 410 (Sup. Ct.), rev'd on other grounds, 268 App. Div. 400, 51 N.Y.S.2d 561
(1944), aff'd, 294 N.Y. 798, 62 N.E.2d 236 (1945).
10. Consolidated Steel Corp. v. Pressed Steel Car Co., 118 Misc. 480, 483, 194 N.Y. Supp.
649, 651 (Sup. Ct. 1922) ; 4 Wiliston, Contracts § 1211 (1936).
11. This is the view of the Restatement, Security § 130(2) (1941). Cf. Standard Factors
Corp. v. Kreisler, 53 N.Y.S.2d 871, 875 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd, 269 App. Div. 830, 56 N.Y.S.2d 414
(1st Dep't 1945).
12. The only negligence on the part of a creditor which operates to discharge a surety Is
that amounting to connivance or fraud. Black v. Ottoman Bank, 15 Moo. 472, 15 Eng. Rep.
573 (P.C. 1862). Where a creditor refuses to sue his debtor, the surety's remedy is a suit In
equity in exoneration to force the principal to pay the debt. Padwick v. Stanley, 9 Hare 627,
68 Eng. Rep. 664 (Ch. 1852).
13. Va. Rev. Code 323 (1803).
14. Although the rule of Pain v. Packard is today recognized as part of the common law
of New York, §§ 3 and 55 of the New York Negotiable Instrument Law render the rule
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the court did not say so explicitly, it was clear that the discharge was meant to
be commensurate with the injury sustained by the surety by reason of such
noncompliance. Thus, since the creditor did not take action until the principal
debtor had become insolvent, the surety was absolved of all liability.
TnE EA.Y HSTORY OF THE RuLE oF PAIN V. PACKAED
One year after its decision, the Pain case encountered vigorous disapproval
by Chancellor Kent in King v. Baldwin,15 where the rule was criticized for
unnecessarily placing a new duty upon the creditor. A suit for exoneration,
said the court, would afford a fully adequate remedy to the surety. Moreover,
it was suggested that to base the existence of such a duty upon mere oral notice
would open a wide area for fraud. Despite such criticism, the New York Court
of Appeals reversed the lower court and reaffirmed the Pain rule.10 In so doing,
the court stated that the very fact that there existed an equitable remedy
pointed to the existence of a legal right,1 7 and that the difficulties of proving
proper notice were not sufficiently unique to warrant discarding the rule. Since
the King case was finally decided by the tie-breaking vote of the then Lieu-
tenant Governor, a layman, it has been argued to be of weak authority.18 The
undisguised disapproval of later courts seems to support this contention.10
The controversial origin of the rule of Pain v. Packard forecast its subsequent
history. There began a gradual, almost systematic attempt by the New York
courts to distinguish and severely limit its application. In the early case of
Warner v. Beardsley, ° the court, while conceding its status as law, explicitly
disapproved of extending the application of the rule to cases in which the facts
were materially different. It was stated that to bring a case within the rule,
the surety must show that the principal was solvent at the time he requested
the creditor to proceed and collect his debts,-' that the principal was within
the jurisdiction of the state at such time, and that the creditor, without any
reasonable excuse, neglected or refused to proceed until the principal debtor
became insolvent and unable to pay.22 Subsequent courts constantly sought
inapplicable to the very facts of that case, since an accommodation maker is novw primarily
liable and not liable merely as a surety. Citizens First Nat'l Bank v. Parkinson, 266 App.
Div. 1055, 44 N.YS.2d 40 (4th Dep't 1943); Loughran, Pain Against Pactard, 3 Fordham
L. Rev. 35, 38-39 (1917).
15. 2 Johns. Ch. 554, 563 (N.Y. 1817).
16. King v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384 (N.Y. 1819).
17. The legal right here referred to is the right of a surety to set up, as a defense to an
action at law, the pro tanto release resulting from the failure of the creditor to sue after notice.
18. See Herrick v. Borst, 4 Hill 650, 656 (N.Y. 1843).
19. See notes 20-24 infra.
20. 8 Wend. 194, 198 (N.Y. 1831).
21. See also Huffman v. Hulbert, 13 Wend. 377 (N.Y. 1835); Herrich v. Borst, 4 Hill
650 (N.Y. 1843); Field v. Cutler, 4 Lans. 195 (N.Y. Sup. CL, Gen. T. 1871); Hunt v. Purdy,
82 N.Y. 486, 490 (180).
22. A discharge under this rule is based upon injury to the surety by reason of the failure
of the creditor to sue after notice. Where it was not shown that the mortgaged praeins had
depreciated in value after the notice was given, the guarantor of payment of a bond secured
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reasons to deny the surety the benefits of the rule. Their exaggerated insistence
on the requirement of an absolutely clear request by the surety upon the creditor
to take legal action, for example, displayed an intent to narrow the scope of
the rule.23 Furthermore, in their reluctance to grant a surety the benefits of the
rule, the courts limited the rule to its exact facts, so that unless the suretyship
agreement was a part of the principal contract, the surety was deemed not
entitled to the Pain remedy.24 Finally, it was required that a surety assume
his obligation solely for the benefit of the principal debtor in order for him
to be able to invoke the rule.25
THE RULE OF PAIN V. PACKARD AS EXTENDED
Although the over-all tendency of the New York courts has been to limit
the rule of Pain v. Packard to its original facts, there have been a few instances
where the courts have seen fit to extend it. Remsen v. Beekman 0 was the first
New York Court of Appeals decision to apply the doctrine to a new situation.
The court held that Pain v. Packard applied to a person, who was not a surety
in the technical sense, but a mortgagor who had conveyed the mortgaged
premises "subject to" the mortgage.
In a "subject to" transfer, the mortgagor and his grantee agree that as
between them, the land is to be the primary fund for payment of the mortgage
debt.2 7 If the mortgagee chooses to proceed first against the land, the mort-
gagor will be liable on his bond only to the extent that the value of the land
is less than the amount of the debt. But if the mortgagee chooses to proceed
first against the mortgagor on the bond, the mortgagor is then entitled to be
by the mortgage was held not injured and therefore not discharged. Hunt v. Purdy, 82 N.Y.
486, 489 (1880).
23. This was in response to the original objection that oral notice tended to produce
fraud. See Fulton v. Matthews, 15 Johns. 433 (N.Y. 1818) (creditor must be "fairly and
fully apprised" of the fact that he is required to prosecute the maker); Valentine v. Farring-
ton, 2 Edw. Ch. 53 (N.Y. 1833) (notice must be "full and explicit"). See also Mutual Life Ins.
Co. v. Davies, 56 How. Pr. 440, 445 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1878) ; Hunt v. Purdy, 82 N.Y. 486, 490
(1880); Denick v. Hubbard, 27 Hun 347, 351 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1882). There was no require-
ment that the notice be in writing. King v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384 (N.Y. 1819). When the
rule has been adopted by statute, however, this requirement has often been imposed. Stearns,
Suretyship § 6.38 (5th ed., Elder 1951). See Myers v. Hoeheimer, 173 Ark. 726, 293 S.W. 42
(1927). The surety had to demand that the creditor take legal action and no other. Singer
v. Troutman, 49 Barb. 182 (N.Y. Sup. Ct., Gen. T. 1867). A demand merely to collect the
money from the debtor was insufficient. Hunt v. Purdy, 82 N.Y. 486, 490 (1880).
24. An indorser of a note, though he is a surety, may not give notice, since his contract
does not arise simultaneously with the transaction creating the indebtedness. Trimble v.
Thorne, 16 Johns. 152, 154 (N.Y. 1819). A party who took a note in payment of a debt and
then transferred it in part payment for a farm purchased by him, at the same time signing It
under the maker's signature, was not a surety within the rule. Wells v. Mann, 45 N.Y. 327
(1871). A mortgagee, though he, when selling the mortgage, guarantees payment, was held
not entitled to give notice. Newcomb v. Hale, 90 N.Y. 326 (1882).
25. See note 24 supra.
26. 25 N.Y. 552 (1862).
27. Osborne, Mortgages § 252 (1951).
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subrogated to the position of the mortgagee. The result is that the land is
"primarily liable" to the extent of its value, and the mortgagor is "secondarily
liable" in that, due to his bond, he is responsbile for the differential between the
value of the land and the full amount of his personal liability.-S Unlike the
situation where the grantee assumes the mortgage, a transfer merely "subject
to" a mortgage involves no personal obligation to pay on the part of the
granteeP For this reason, it has been held that the "subject to" transfer gives
rise to a "quasi surety" relationship. 3
The holding in the Remsen case contravened the prior limitation that the
surety be one for accommodation whose contract was part and parcel of the
original transaction,a1 since not only does a transferring mortgagor receive
concrete consideration in the form of the purchase price of the land, but his
suretyship arises in an entirely distinct transaction from that creating the
indebtedness. Remsen appears further to extend the rule by including within
its bounds one who is not technically a surety.
Several years later, the New York Court of Appeals, in Colgrove v. Tallman 2
broadened further the concept of a surety entitled to the protection of the
rule of Pain v. Packard. Under the facts of that case, a partnership was dis-
solved, one of the two copartners purchasing the interest of the other, and
agreeing to pay the partnership debts. The retiring partner was held an
equitable surety for those debts and entitled to the remedy of Pain v. Packard.
Thus the Colgrove case is similarly in opposition to the previously established
limitations. Even assuming that the retiring partner received no consideration
for his exit from the firm, which apparently was not the case, the transaction
creating the partnership debts had no relation in time to his becoming a surety.
Common to both Remsen and Colgrove is the fact that the surety was not
such by voluntary agreement. Rather this status as a surety was imposed upon
him by operation of law. Perhaps the court felt equitably justified, for this
reason, in extending the added benefit of Pain v. Packard. 3
There is some lower court authority for extending the Pain rule to cases
28. Johnson v. Zink, 51 N.Y. 333, 336 (1873).
29. Where the premises are transferred to an assuming grantee, the latter agrees that as
between himself and the mortgagor he will be personally liable for the mortgage debt. Os-
borne, op. cit. supra note 27, § 253 S8. A discussion of the rights of the mortgagee as
against the assuming grantee may be found in Osborne, op. cit. supra note 27, §§ 260-64.
30. See Murray v. Marshall, 94 N.Y. 611, 615 (18S4), where it is said: "While . . . no
strict and technical relation of principal and surety arose ... from the conveyance subject
to the mortgage, an equity did arise... which bears a very dose resemblance to the equi-
table right of a surety... .'
31. See note 24 supra.
32. 67 N.Y. 95 (1876).
33. Apparently on similar reasoning, several later appellate division cases have applied
the Pain rule to a mortgagor who transfers "subject to" the mortgage. See Ozborne v. Hey-
ward, 40 App. Div. 78, 57 N.Y. Supp. 542 (2d Dep't 1S99); Gottschalk v. Jungmann, 78
App. Div. 171, 173, 79 N.Y. Supp. 551, 552-53 (Ist Dep't 1903); Union Trust Co. v. Rogers,
261 App. Div. SS2, 25 N.Y.S.2d 120 (4th Dep't 1941).
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where a mortgagor transfers to an assuming grantee.3 4 Although such a mort-
gagor is, of course, a true surety, as apposed to a quasi surety, he is also a
surety by operation of law whose status is not that of an accommodation
surety who simultaneously became obligated with the principal debtor.
THE FERmc CASE
The right of a mortgagor, transferring property "subject to" the mortgage,
to invoke the rule of Pain v. Packard confronted the Appellate Division, Third
Department in the Fermac case. On appeal, the mortgagor asserted, as a
defense to a deficiency judgment rendered against him, that he had given notice
to the mortgage to foreclose at a time when the land's value was sufficient to
satisfy the entire mortgage debt, that the mortgagee had neglected to do so and
that the land had depreciated, creating the deficiency in question. The court
held that this was an adequate ground for discharge of the mortgagor, citing as
authority, the Remsen case.
The decision, however, was "two pronged" in that, immediately prior to the
request to sue, when the land's value was sufficient to satisfy the entire mortgage
debt, the mortgagor had made a tender to the mortgagee offering to pay the
debt in full for an assignment and such was refused by the mortgagee. The
court held that this was an alternative ground for discharge, and were not the
rule of Pain v. Packard adhered to under this set of circumstances, the mort-
gagor would still not be liable for the deficiency on the basis of such tender.
CRITIQUE OF PAIN V. PACKARD AS APPLIED IN NEW Yopx
There is conflict as to the justification of the Pain doctrine.3  Those author-
ities favoring the rule emphasize that since equity, when it does act in enforcing
the surety's right of exoneration, proceeds on the principle that it is the duty
of the creditor to obtain payment in the first instance from the principal debtor,
there is no reason why this same duty cannot be brought into exercise by an
act in pais and without the interposition of a court of equity, so as to give a
right at law.3 6 On the other hand, disapproval of the rule is grounded on the
fact that it unjustifiably imposes an added duty of active diligence upon the
creditor, while the surety's right of exoneration places no such burden upon
him.37 Additionally, the rule is argued to be a source of unnecessary litigation
inasmuch as it opens a ". . . litigious inquiry as to the certainty and efficiency
of the notice .... ,"3 Finally, it is contended that the rule affords to a surety
34. Russell v. Weinberg, 4 Abb. N. Cas. 139 (Brooklyn City Ct. 1878); Buffalo Say. Bank
v. Threeinwon Realty Corp., 175 Misc. 807, 26 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
35. See note 4 supra for authorities which accord justification for the doctrine and note 40
infra for authorities which refuse to accord justification for the rule.
36. King v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384 (N.Y. 1819); Remsen v. Beckman, 25 N.Y. 552
(1862).
37. See, for example, the lower court opinion in King v. Baldwin, 2 Johns. Ch. 554 (N.Y.
1817).
38. King v. Baldwin, 17 Johns. 384, 391 (N.Y. 1819), wherein the court was speaking of
the reasons put forth by the lower court which held the rule to be unnecessary.
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a temptation to fraud. 9 The reasoning for disapproval of the rule has been
accepted by the weight of authority,0 and appears to be the more logical, not-
withstanding the enactment of the rule of Pain v. Packard into statutes by
eighteen states.41 If to transpose an equitable right into a court of law involves,
as it does in the application of the rule, the unwarranted impairment of the
creditor's contractual rights against the surety, such a transposition seems dearly
unjustified. The rationale behind the numerous New York cases, attempting
to limit the rule of Pain v. Packard, therefore, has considerable merit. Never-
theless cases like the Fermac decision seem intent upon continuing to extend
the application of the rule to persons who are sureties by operation of law.
Are there any specific equities in favor of a surety by operation of law which,
though they cannot fully justify such an extension of Pain v. Packard, might
at least render it more acceptable? It would appear not. There is nothing
altruistic about a mortgagor who transfers "subject to" the mortgage. Unlike
an accommodation surety, he receives concrete value in the form of the purchase
price, and, therefore, can in no manner be considered as having entered the
contract solely for the benefit of his grantee. 2 Nor did his status as a surety
arise simultaneously with the principal contract.L4 3 Finally, he stands to lose
nothing by being deprived of the protection offered under Pain v. Packard,
since the alternative is the tried and proven remedy of exoneration." The
single factor in his favor, and in favor of a retiring partner, seems to be that
they are sureties by operation of law, not having voluntarily chosen their posi-
tions. However, in viewing the transactions which give rise to a suretyship by
operation of law, it is evident that such an obligation is imposed solely as a
means of preserving an existent obligation intact, thereby preventing a mort-
gagor or retiring partner from gaining any unfair advantages. In the mortgage
transfer situation, for example, the personal liability of the mortgagor must be
preserved in the form of a "suretyship" or the mortgagee would stand to lose
his original investment if the land depreciated below the amount of the debt.
Likewise, a retiring partner ought not be permitted to withdraw from the firm
to the detriment of firm creditors.
It would seem then that this phase of the Fermac decision, holding that a
transferring mortgagor is privileged to invoke the rule of Pain v. Packard, as
well as all other cases which tend to perpetuate the unwarranted extension of
an equally unwarranted rule, are subject to grave criticism. Whether the New
York Court of Appeals may see fit to overrule Pain v. Packard, or at least to
39. King v. Baldwin, 2 Johns. Ch. 554, 563 (1317).
40. Stearns, Suretyship § 6.38 (5th ed., Elder 1951). Sea Kemp Lumber Co. v. Stanley,
22 N.M. 193, 160 Pac. 351 (1916); Bank v. McAllister's Estate, 56 Neb. ISS, 76 N.W. 552
(189S); Inkster v. First Nat'l Bank, 30 Mich. 143, 147 (1374); Bull v. Allen, 19 Conn. 101,
106 (1348); Frye v. Barker, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 332 (1326); and cases cited in Annot,
1918C L.R.A. 11-12. See also Restatement, Security § 130(1) (1941).
41. See note 4 supra.
42. See note 24 supra.
43. Ibid.
44. See note 3 supra; Marsh v. Pike, 10 Paige Ch. 595 (N.Y. 1344); Friedman, Discharge
of Personal Liability on Mortgage Debts in New York, 52 Yale L.J. 771, 795 (1943).
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curtail these liberal extensions of the doctrine is problematical. 4 As of the
present, of course, both remain the law.
RULES RELATING TO DISCHARGE OF QUASI SuRETY
The rule of Pain v. Packard from its inception has afforded a pro tanto dis-
charge, that is, a discharge to the extent that the surety is injured by the
creditor's failure to sue.46 On the other hand, where a creditor refuses a true
surety's tender, the latter is discharged from all liability on his contract, without
regard to the actual injury sustained.47
The court in Fermac held that the mortgagor was discharged of all liability
for deficiency, because the tender occurred when the land's value was in excess
of the mortgage debt. Can such a position with respect to a quasi surety be
reconciled with the above rules concerning the discharge of a true surety? It
would appear so.
The facts in the Fermac case indicate that between the time when the mort-
gagee was requested to sue and the time of trial, twenty months intervened
and the land depreciated $7,000 in value. The trial court held that one month
after the request was an excusable delay and that the seven month calendar
wait was also an excusable delay, so that of the twenty month delay, the delay
for twelve months only was inexcusable on the part of the mortgagee. Appar-
ently proceeding on the theory that the quasi surety received a pro tanto
discharge on the basis of either the tender or request to sue, the trial court,
assuming that the rate of depreciation was uniform, apportioned the depreciation
between the date of the request to sue and the date of trial. It held the mort-
gagor was discharged from liability for the deficiency caused by the inexcusable
delay of twelve months, amounting to $4,200 or 12/20 of $7,000, but that the
mortgagor would be liable for any deficiency in excess of $4,200.
Nevertheless, the appellate division, on the facts of the case, ruled that the
trial court erred even in the application of the rule of a pro tanto discharge,
since it had disregarded the fact that, at the time of the tender of the full
amount then unpaid on the mortgage, the mortgaged premises were of sufficient
value to satisfy the mortgage debt in full. In modifying the judgment of the
trial court, the appellate division, without explicit statement to such effect,
apparently only decided that the lower court had merely wrongly applied the
correct rule of a pro tanto discharge. By implication, the rule to be derived
45. Since the decision in the Fermac case, there have been no Court of Appeals cases
adopting its position with the exception of its affirmance in 266 N.Y. 443, 195 N.E. 145
(1934), without opinion, leaving serious doubt as to the grounds on which it was affirmed.
Several lower court cases, however, seem to view it with approval. See Matter of Lafayette
Nat'l Bank, 254 App. Div. 207, 4 N.Y.S.2d 356 (2d Dep't 1938); Union Trust Co. v. Rogers,
261 App. Div. 882, 25 N.Y.S.2d 120 (4th Dep't 1941); Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Barca Realty
Corp., 48 N.Y.S.2d 306 (Sup. Ct. 1943).
46. Chapman v. Hoage, 296 U.S. 526, 530 (1936); Friedman, op. cit. supra note 44;
Glenn, Purchasing Subject to Mortgage, 27 Va. L. Rev. 853, 869 (1941); Osborne, op. cit.
supra note 27, § 258. Where statutes have been enacted, there is some conflict. See Stearns,
op. cit. supra note 23.
47. Arant, Suretyship § 59 (1931) ; Stearns, op. cit. supra note 23, § 6.53.
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from Fernac, relating to the "tender" discharge of a quasi surety may be sum-
marized as follows: a discharge on the ground of a refusal of a quasi surety's
tender is a pro tanto discharge computed as of the time of the tender, since that
is when the injury to the surety's right of subrogation accrues. It can be, as it
was in Fermac, a complete discharge from all liability for deficiency, if the
land's value is equal to, or more than, the mortgage debt at the time of tender.
It does not lose its character as a pro tanto discharge, but merely, on such facts,
discharges the mortgagor from all liability.
A full understanding of this proposition may be attained by examining the
similarities which exist between the "tender" discharge in Ferinac and the
settled law concerning the discharge of a quasi surety on another ground, Tz.,
an extension of the maturity date by the creditor without the surety's assent.
It is generally held that such an extension, like a refusal of tender, discharges
a true surety from all liability on his contract.49 Courts take this position partly
because the contract with a new due date is not the one to which the surety
agreed.49 The major reason appears to be that an extension defers and thus
impairs the surety's right to pay at maturity and sue the principal for reimburse-
ment.50 With respect to a quasi surety, there has been conflict. Originally, a few
jurisdictions subscribed to the view that he is not strictly a surety, and is, there-
fore, not released at all.51 New York and the present weight of authority, how-
ever, grant the quasi surety a pro tanto release to the extent of the value of the
land at the time when the extension agreement is made.r2 In the leading case on
the discharge of a quasi surety (a transferring mortgagor) by such an extension
of the maturity date, it was held that he was discharged only to the extent he was
a surety, that the mortgagor was a surety only up to the value of the land, and
that beyond the value of the land, the mortgagor was still the principal debtor
with no remaining equities.53 Such reasoning is settled law with respect to the
4S. Calvo v. Davies, 73 N.Y. 211 (137S); National Park Bank v. Koehler, 204 N.Y. 174,
97 N.E. 468 (1912).
49. See Stearns, op. cit. supra note 23, § 6.16; Becker v. Faber, 2S0 N.Y. 146, 19 N.E.2d
997 (1939).
g0. Arant, op. cit. supra note 47, § 6S, at 2S5.
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"extension" discharge of a quasi surety, and, being so readily applicable to a
"tender" discharge of a quasi surety, appears to be the basis for the "tender"
discharge granted by the Fermac case.
Since the Pain rule has always afforded a pro tanto discharge, there is no
question but that a quasi surety also receives a pro tanto discharge under the
rule. However, as in the case of a "tender" or "extension" discharge, so under
the Pain rule, a quasi surety can only be discharged to the extent he, as a
surety, is injured. Nevertheless, there is authority lacking as to the method of
computing the extent of a quasi surety's injury under the Pain rule.
Although the Pain rule was applicable in the Fermac case as an alternative
ground for discharge, the discharge to be derived from its application was
nevertheless absorbed within the more extensive "tender" discharge, which the
court held was alone ground for a reversal of the deficiency judgment. The
appellate division left unanswered the question concerning the method to be
used in computing the pro tanto discharge of the quasi surety under the Pain
rule. Granting that the ruling of the trial court in Fermac was incorrect due to
the tender being made and refused when the value of the land was sufficient
to satisfy the debt, and due to the unwarranted assumption that the land
depreciated at a uniform rate during the time between the request and the fore-
closure, its basic theory for computing the pro tanto discharge of a quasi surety
under the Pain rule was sound, since an attempt was made to compute the
actual injury sustained.
In view of the lack of clear or conclusive authority as to the method of com-
puting the pro tanto discharge of a quasi surety under the Pain rule, it is sub-
mitted that in attempting to determine the time of computation at which the
quasi surety's injury begins to accrue, consideration be given to two time
periods following the request to sue. First, the creditor should be accorded a
"reasonable time" after the request within which to bring the foreclosure suit.
Secondly, any court calendar wait that would be incurred by the creditor if
suit were brought within such "reasonable time" should be considered. These
successive time periods, when added together, constitute an excusable delay on
the part of the creditor, since the foreclosure could not under any circumstances
be decreed any sooner in time than at the end of such delay. The time for
computing a quasi surety's discharge under the Pain rule should, therefore, be
the last day of such excusable delay following the date of the request, no matter
when the foreclosure suit was actually brought by the creditor, with the result
that the quasi surety is discharged from liability for any deficiency accruing
subsequent to such date.
CONCLUSION
The proposition that Pain v. Packard extends to a quasi surety as well as
other sureties by operation of law, whatever its merit, must be accepted as
subsisting law until the question is conclusively passed upon by the New
York Court of Appeals. Pain applies in this state, therefore: (1) to an accom-
modation surety who assumes this position simultaneously with the creation of
the debt, and (2) to a person who becomes a true or quasi surety by operation
of law.
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